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Abstract 
 
Along with the massive growth in Internet 
commerce over the last ten years there has been a 
corresponding boom in Internet related crime, or 
cybercrime. According to research recently released by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2006 57,000 
Australians aged 15 years and over fell victim to 
phishing and related Internet scams. Of all the victims 
of cybercrime, only one group is potentially subject to 
criminal prosecution: ‘Internet money mules’ – those 
who, either knowingly or unknowingly, launder money. 
This paper examines the demographic profile – 
specifically age, gender and postcode  – related to 660 
confirmed money mule incidents recorded during the 
calendar year 2007, for a major Australian financial 
institution. This data is compared to ABS statistics of 
Internet usage in 2006. There is clear evidence of a 
strong gender bias towards males, particularly in the 
older age group.  This is directly relevant when 
considering education and training programs for both 
corporations and the community on the issues 
surrounding Internet money mule scams and in 
ultimately understanding the problem of Internet 
banking fraud.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the massive growth in Internet commerce in 
the last ten years there has been a corresponding boom 
in Internet crime.  Criminals are using the borderless 
Internet to reach far from their home countries. Since 
2003 a large portion of this crime has been fraud 
against Internet banks and their customers. Criminals 
compromise users credentials for various Internet 
Banks capturing their credentials by either getting the 
user to visit a fake banking site called a Phishing site 
or by using some malicious computer code (called a 
Trojan or crimeware) placed on the victim’s machine 
to capture those details when victims go the real 
banking website [8].  The criminals then use these 
credentials to log onto the victims accounts and 
illegally withdraw funds.  
While the criminals can easily access Internet Banks 
and perform transactions from the other side of the 
world they cannot necessary get the money into their 
own hands so easily.  Some early Internet fraud used 
the Overseas Telegraphic Transfer (OTT) functionality 
of some Internet Banks to repatriate the fraudulently 
obtained funds directly to other countries.  However 
the Internet Banks with this facility quickly began to 
limit this functionality or tightly scrutinize any 
transactions that did occur looking for suspicious 
recipients and the countries being used by criminals to 
receive funds.  This created a problem for the criminals 
- how to get the money out of the victims’ country.  
Out of this problem the “Internet money mule” was 
born.  One of earliest known cases was in Australia. 
On Monday 17 March 2003 an email was sent out 
purporting to be from “admins at Commonwealth 
Bank” directing customers to a Florida hosted copy of 
the Commonwealth Bank Of Australia website, which 
is now known as a phishing site.  A number of 
customers gave up their credentials to the website.  
Shortly after the credentials were used to transfer 
money to the account of a Tasmanian man who had 
been recruited on a Croatian Community website to 
receive the money and then transfer it to Eastern 
Europe. The Australian Federal Police subsequently 
arrested this man when he tried to draw some of the 
fraudulently obtained funds out of his own account.  
The man escaped prosecution at the time as he claimed 
he was unaware that the moneys were illegally 
obtained [7]. 
When the Internet fraud is investigated the Internet 
money mules are generally easily identified and any 
fraudulently obtained funds that may have been kept as 
the “commission” fee are recovered. It does not matter 
whether the Internet money mule is fully aware of the 
crime being committed or ultimately is just an innocent 
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agent as they rarely benefit from the crime.  The 
criminals that recruit them do not care as the mules 
have served their purpose and pose no threat to the 
criminal enterprise. Thus in most cases the Internet 
money mules are expendable dupes for overseas 
criminals. 
There is little meaningful data to show the extent of 
the problem of Internet money mules in Australia. A 
recent data source in regard to fraud more generally in 
Australia is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
Personal Fraud Survey [2], conducted throughout 
Australia during July to December 2007. According to 
the survey a total of 806,000 Australians aged 15 years 
and over were victims of at least one incident of 
personal fraud in the 12 months prior to interview. This 
equated to a victimisation rate for personal fraud of 5% 
of the population aged 15 years and over. There were 
453,100 victims who lost money in the 12 months prior 
to interview, incurring a combined financial loss of 
almost one billion dollars ($977 million). Of the 
victims who lost money to personal frauds, the median 
financial loss was $450 per person, while the mean loss 
was $2,156 per person. 
While no other demographic research is available 
for incidences of Internet money mules there is data 
relating to fraud offenders more generally.   In 2007 
international tax and audit consultancy, KPMG, 
selected 360 cases of white collar fraud against the 
company identified by its own forensic division for 
analysis. Their findings were published in the "Profile 
of a Fraudster Survey 2007." [6] The survey concluded 
that in the corporate world, 70 per cent of white collar 
crimes are committed by people between 36 and 55 
years; over 80 per cent of fraudsters are male; and 
members of senior management, including board 
members represent 60 per cent of all fraudsters.  While 
Internet money mules are not necessarily fraudsters per 
se they may share some of the characteristics of them. 
This paper examines the demographic profile – 
specifically age, gender and postcode residence – of 
660 cases of confirmed money mule incidents during 
the calendar year 2007, for one major Australian 
financial institution.  We compare them against 2006 
ABS statistics of Internet usage [1] using as a null 
hypothesis the assumption that the age, gender and 
state of residence of money mules will mirror that of 
general Internet usage.   
 
2. A Background to Internet Money Mule 
Scams 
 
Online criminals who conduct phishing and Trojan 
attacks need Internet money mules to receive the 
fraudulently obtained funds into their bank accounts 
for onward forwarding to the overseas based criminals 
[9]. These criminals advertise for Internet money 
mules through spam email, Internet messaging and 
both fraudulent and legitimate employment web sites.  
They claim to be legitimate employment opportunities 
with mules receiving between 7% to 10% of funds 
transferred via their accounts as a commission. 
In Western Australia, the Department of Consumer 
and Employment Protection’s ‘WAScamNet’ database 
recorded 1,709 employment and money mule email 
offers reported by consumers in October 2006 alone. 
This was 59 percent of all scam emails reported. This 
category represented the largest category of scam 
emails reported to the Department each month [3].   
 
3.  Anatomy of an Internet Banking Fraud 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship of the money mule 
to Internet banking fraud, and is an example of a 
typical Internet banking fraud.  The first Phase in the 
Internet banking fraud involves the criminal sending a 
phishing email or Trojan infected or lure email to 
thousands of potential victims. A small percentage of 
those receiving a phishing email actually respond, 
usually by confirming their account details or in the 
other case are infected with a Trojan and have these 
details compromised when they conduct a real session 
with their Internet bank (Phase 2). Our victim in this 
example has ‘clean money’ (c$) in their bank account. 
According to the ABS [2] in 12 months over 5.8 
million Australians were exposed to phishing emails 
(this involved people receiving and viewing or reading 
an unsolicited invitation, request, notification or offer, 
designed to obtain their personal information or money 
or otherwise obtain a financial benefit by deceptive 
means), and of those 5.7% (or 329,000 people) became 
victims by responding to the scam by supplying 
personal information, money or both, or seeking more 
information. 
In Phase 3, the potential mule is approached with a 
job offer, which is usually advertised by unsolicited 
spam email, Internet messaging and both fraudulent 
and legitimate employment web sites. Mules are 
recruited using job titles such as “Financial Managers”, 
“Representatives”, “Agents” or the like, and are 
typically promised a 7-10% fee for transferring funds. 
In order for the transfer to take place mules need to 
supply their current bank account details or if they 
choose set up a new account for this purpose supply 
those details (Phase 4). In Phase 5 the criminal 
transfers money from a compromised bank account 
into the mules account. The mule, simply doing what 
their ‘job’ requires, transfers this ‘dirty’ money (d$) – 
minus their fee – via financial transfer services such as 
483
Western Union to an overseas address (Phase 6).  The 
Internet banking fraud now complete typically the 
Internet bank involved identifies the Internet money 
mule and recovers the fee from the mule.  The mule 
may then be subject to prosecution if it can be proven 
that they laundered the proceeds of crime however this 
generally requires them to have the requisite guilty 
knowledge or at least be reckless to the fact. 
 
Figure 1. Anatomy of an Internet fraud 
 
4. Methodology 
The data used in this paper has been obtained from 
de-identified database material gathered by the Internet 
fraud investigation team of a major Australian financial 
institution. As a basis of comparison, the ABS Patterns 
of Internet Access in Australia Survey 2006 [1] was 
used. 
The data supplied by the financial institution is 
particularly relevant as it represents actual cases of 
Internet money mule activity – where the mules had 
willingly given their account details for the receipt of 
illegally obtained funds. Unlike survey data it is not 
subject to possible bias that is often evident in self-
report statistics. It also represents a complete set of 
data, as it includes every case investigated by that 
financial institution for a calendar year (2007). While 
no doubt the financial institution’s investigation 
database on money mules is extensive, the fields 
supplied to the authors were less detailed to maintain 
confidentiality: gender (male, female or joint account 
holder), age in years (whole numbers), and postcode. 
According to fraud investigators at the financial 
institution, each case was entered in the investigation 
database chronologically as each incident of fraud was 
discovered or reported to bank staff. [5] 
The ABS Patterns of Internet Access in Australia 
Survey 2006 data represents numbers of people who 
have access to the Internet, based on the 2006 Census 
[1]. 
As the Internet money mule activity referred to in 
this paper involves those who have access to the 
Internet it is assumed that the demographic profile of 
money mules would mirror that of the general Internet 
user.  Another hypothesis that they may otherwise 
mirror other Internet banking customers was 
discounted as investigators advised many of the 
Internet money mules were in fact new customers. [5] 
The age categories selected were based on those 
used in the ABS survey. In the data set obtained by the 
financial institution there was a total of 130 people 
where the age was unknown. There ages were 
distributed in the sample population in the same ratio 
as the distribution for those with known age as 79 male 
and 51 female.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
A total of 660 accounts received illegally obtained 
funds.  Of these 26 were in the name of joint account 
holders. For the purpose of this paper it was assumed 
that both account holders were money mules making 
the total number of money mules, 686. Table 1 
represents the 686 money mules identified by the 
financial institution.  In 71 cases there were multiple 
deposits made on different days.  
 
Table 1.  Internet money mules by age and 
gender by number 
 
 
Of the 686 money mules, 429 were male and 257 
were female (Table 1). This meant in percentage terms 
males comprised 62.39% and females 37.61% (Figure 
2).  Of the 71 multiple instance of money mule 
activity, 53 were male and 21 were female.  
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 Figure 2. Percentage break down of males and 
females from ABS statistics on Internet users 
compared to Internet Money Mules 
5.1. Categorical Analysis of Mule Data 
5.1.1. Sex Differences. The expected occurrence of 
male and female mules (all other things being equal) 
would be 343 each. Using a Pearson chi-square 
analysis, 2=21.91, df=1, p = <.0001, so there are 
significantly more male mules than female mules 
overall. 
5.1.2. Age x Sex Differences. A Pearson chi-square 
analysis was performed within the different age bands 
shown in Table 1. The results are summarized below: 
• < 15: 2=0.00, df=1, p = 1.00, so there are no 
differences between males and females in this 
age range. 
• 15-24: 2=7.11, df=1, p = 0.0077, so there are 
significantly more male mules than female 
mules in this age range. 
• 25-34: 2=5.48, df=1, p = 0.0192, so there are 
significantly more male mules than female 
mules in this age range. 
• 35-44: 2=0.83, df=1, p = 0.3623, so there are 
no differences between males and females in 
this age range. 
• 45-54: 2=1.24, df=1, p = 0.2655, so there are 
no differences between males and females in 
this age range. 
• 55-64: 2=4.86, df=1, p = 0.0275, so there are 
significantly more male mules than female 
mules in this age range. 
• 65-74: 2=6.03, df=1, p = 0.0141, so there are 
significantly more male mules than female 
mules in this age range. 
• 75+: 2=3.61, df=1, p = 0.05, so there are 
significantly more male mules than female 
mules in this age range. 
5.1.1. Multiple Instances Sex Differences. The 
expected occurrence of repeat offender male and 
female mules (all other things being equal) would be 
35 each. Using a Pearson chi-square analysis, 2=7.08, 
df=1, p=0.0078, so there are significantly more 
multiple instances male mules than female mules. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Naturally there are statistical limitations to this 
work however the significance of the raw data cannot 
be underestimated. It is rare to obtain archival data sets 
such as this, and with this in mind, we seek to find any 
preliminary statistical trends and patterns, which 
emerge, many which warrant further investigation. 
There is a strong gender bias towards Internet 
money mules being males. This is even greater when 
the element of potential criminal intent is introduced 
with multiple instances (In multiple instances the 
mules have usually been advised the nature of the fraud 
already). The bias progressively increases as the age of 
the money mule increases. The proposition that males 
are more prone to this type of risky endeavour is partly 
supported by the KPMG Survey [6], which indicated 
that in 85 percent of profiles fraudsters were male. 
However this survey was heavily influenced by frauds 
against the company often by insiders who were senior 
management or executives (roles where men often 
predominate).   
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage break by age group from 
ABS statistics on Internet users compared to 
Internet Money Mules 
 
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the financial 
institutions mule data against the ABS statistics for 
Internet usage across the various age categories. Of the 
money mules, people between 25 and 34 represented 
32.94 percent of the total, while those aged between 35 
and 44 a represented 22.45 percent. Over 55 percent of 
all money mules were aged between 25 and 44. The 
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low representation (1.75 percent) of young people aged 
between 5 and 14 (even though they are a significant 
percentage of the total internet users – 17.22 percent) is 
expected as it would be more difficult for minors to 
open bank accounts without parental or guardian 
consent.  
In the 45 – 54 year old category the total number of 
mules are roughly consistent with the number of 
Internet users (16.65 percent versus 15.16 percent 
respectively). In the over 55, 65, and 75 categories 
mules are proportionally less then Internet users for the 
same categories. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage breaks down of males 
and females by age groups from ABS 
statistics on Internet users compared to 
Internet Money Mules 
Figure 4 shows the ABS and mule data age 
categories with gender highlighted. Apart from the 
equal distribution of mules in the Under 15 age group, 
there are significantly more males represented in every 
age category of the mule data. This difference is 
particularly evident in the 15 – 24 age range and in the 
25 – 34 age groups. Of further interest is the complete 
absence of female mules in all age groups over 65. 
 
6.1. Analysis of Mule Postcodes 
In the data set supplied to researchers by the 
financial institution was the postcode of the Internet 
money mule accounts involved in 660 incidents in 
2007. Using that data the percentage breakdown 
between States and Territories was calculated. 
Researchers then compared these percentages to the 
2006 ABS figures for Internet users by State and 
Territory. 
 
Figure 5. Postcodes of Internet money mules 
accounts mapped on Australia 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Postcodes of Internet money mules 
accounts mapped on Sydney 
 
Figure 7 shows the results of that comparison. 
While Queensland has a very similar percentage of 
mules to Internet users 20.09% to 20.69% the two most 
populous and with the largest urban centres NSW and 
Victoria account for a larger portion of the mules than 
Internet users.  With NSW being 34.76% of the mules 
compared to 32.59% of the ABS Internet users and 
more significantly Victoria being 33.19% of the mules 
to 24.73% of the ABS Internet users.  All the 
remaining states and territories representing fewer 
Mules than the ABS Internet users.  Western Australia 
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being 6.42% of the mules compared to 10.17% of the 
ABS Internet users.  South Australia being 3.29% of 
the mules compared to 7.49% of the ABS Internet 
users.  Tasmania being 0.94% of the mules compared 
to 2.20% of the ABS Internet users and finally 
Northern Territory being 0.16% of the mules compared 
to 0.75% of the ABS Internet users.  
 
Figure 7. Percentage break down by state and 
territory from ABS statistics on Internet users 
compared to Internet Money Mules 
While one needs to exercise caution with drawing 
broad conclusions from this it does raise the possibility 
that those in populous states with large urban centres 
like Sydney and Melbourne are more prone to 
becoming mules. This will however require further 
research to establish.  Further work is currently 
underway to create a heat map of these postcodes and 
to examine trends between urban and rural areas of 
each state and territory and of Australia as a whole.  To 
illustrate the potential of this future work Figure 5 
maps the mule postcodes on a map of Australia and 
Figure 6 on a map of the Sydney metropolitan area. 
7. Conclusion 
While this analysis is really preliminary and there is 
more work to be done to fully exploit the data it 
already does present a number of areas for future 
research.  A clear trend is the over representation of 
males particularly in the 25-34 age group and in older 
age ranges where males predominate.  The Internet 
money mule data needs to be further investigated in 
conjunction with similar profiling such as the work by 
KPMG [6].   
While the size of the sample is small (some 660) it 
is the first look at Internet money mules as a group and 
is actual incident data rather than based on surveys. 
When compared to other human factors research in the 
cybercrime area such as Dhamija’s “Why Phishing 
Works” [4] where the sample size was a paltry 22, the 
sample is actually quite large. 
The geographical data itself needs further analysis 
and this will also form the basis of future research.  
Whether the differences in locality between the ABS 
Internet users and Internet money mule data are 
significant still needs to be shown.  Of particular 
interest would be looking at whether there are any 
differences between urban and rural communities. 
The key lessons from this research and subsequent 
work is to better understand Internet money mule 
profiles so education can be targeted to those 
individuals and to better educate bank staff to identify 
those setting up accounts to be Internet Money Mules. 
While this demographic data does clearly help in 
this regard other profile elements need to be looked at 
in future research.  These could include such things as 
profiling how Internet money mule accounts are 
established and operated in contrast to other account 
establishments. 
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